

## Message Text

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S/S - MR. SEBASTIAN

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TO USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 300849 TOSEC 320190

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCHAUFEELE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, RH, ZA

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: YOUR DEC. 11 APPOINTMENT  
WITH MARK CHONA

1. ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER MARK  
CHONA IS COMING TO SEE YOU IN LONDON AT 0945 AM ON  
SATURDAY, DEC. 11. ASSISTANT SECRETARY REINHARDT AND  
FRANK WISNER WILL BE PRESENT.

2. SETTING: CHONA ASKED TO SEE YOU AT PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S  
REQUEST, APPARENTLY STIMULATED BY YOUR LETTER TO KAUNDA  
OF DEC. 6 (STATE 296386). THAT LETTER HAD A STRONG IMPACT,  
AND STORIES ABOUT IT HAVE LEAKED TO THE PRESS WITH REFER-  
ENCES TO LETTERS YOU SENT TO NYERERE AND KAUNDA AUG. 31 AND  
SEPT. 26 (TEXTS REPEATED SEPTELS). SUGGESTION MADE IN  
LONDON DAILY MAIL STORY OF DEC. 9 THAT YOU WERE ATTEMPTING  
TO "WATER DOWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA"  
HAS APPARENTLY LED TO SOME CONCERN IN GENEVA THAT WE MAY  
HAVE ENGAGED IN DOUBLE-DEALING. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALTHOUGH  
KAUNDA TOLD AMBASSADOR LOW THAT YOUR LETTER CAME AS A GREAT  
SHOCK, AND HIS REPLY SHOWS RESENTMENT OF YOUR STRAIGHT TALK,  
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THE ZAMBIAN REACTION MAY WELL REFLECT CONCERN ABOUT THE  
GLOOMY PROSPECTS FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IF NO SOLUTION  
CAN BE FOUND TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE NATIONALIST  
POSITIONS AND SMITH'S. IN HIS TALK WITH WISNER ON DEC. 9,

CHONA LEFT IMPRESSION HE WOULD NOT DWELL ON PAST HISTORY WHEN HE SEES YOU BUT WILL CONCENTRATE ON DISCUSSING WAYS OF TRANSFERRING POWER DURING THE TRANSITION TO ZIMBABWEAN MAJORITY RULE, ADVANCING IDEAS HE GAVE REINHARDT AND WISNER (GENEVA 9552 AND GENEVA 9665 REPEATED SEPTELS).

3. ISSUES/TALKING POINTS

A. MISUNDERSTANDING OF YOUR DEC. 6 LETTER: THOUGH HE MAY NOT DWELL ON IT CHONA WILL RAISE KAUNDA'S CONCERN AT WHAT THEY READ AS AN IMPLICATION THAT KAUNDA "ACCEPTED" A TWO-TIERED STRUCTURE AND A COUNCIL OF STATE. CHONA MAY ALSO EXPRESS CONCERN THAT YOUR LETTER, ALONG WITH OFFICIAL U.S. SILENCE ON SMITH'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT HAVING A "CONTRACT" WITH YOU ON THE FIVE POINTS, IMPLIES SOME KIND OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO SMITH ABOUT THE NATURE OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. NEITHER POINT IS TRUE, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REASSURE CHONA ON THESE POINTS, NOTING THAT WE WANT TO AVOID RECRIMINATIONS ABOUT WHO SAID WHAT AND MOVE ON TO DISCUSSING WHERE WE CAN GO FROM HERE.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- I AM PLEASED PRESIDENT KAUNDA ASKED YOU TO COME SEE ME AS I KNOW WE CAN CLEAR THE AIR AND CONCENTRATE ON ESSENTIALS. I WAS INDEED DISTRESSED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT MY LETTER MAY HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED, AS I HAVE THE HIGHEST ESTEEM FOR PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND REGARD HIM AS A LEADING AFRICAN STATESMAN.

-- LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT AT NO TIME DID I INTEND TO SUGGEST, AND A CLOSE READING OF MY WORDS WILL SHOW THAT I DID NOT SAY, THAT ANY OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS HAD AGREED TO A TWO-TIERED INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN ADVANCE. MY POINT WAS THAT THE BASIC CONCEPTS INVOLVED IN THE TWO-TIER APPROACH, INCLUDING SOMETHING LIKE A COUNCIL OF STATE, HAD BEEN DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF TIMES BEFORE I WENT TO  
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PRETORIA AND DID NOT SIMPLY ARISE FROM MY MEETING WITH SMITH.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT SMITH'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT A "CONTRACT" WITH THE U.S. ARE EQUALLY UNTRUE.

-- SMITH SOUGHT TO ANNOUNCE HIS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IN MUCH VAGUER WORDING THAN HE FINALLY USED BUT WE PRESSED HIM TO PUT HIS WILLINGNESS INTO MORE SPECIFIC, NEGOTIABLE TERMS TO MAKE IT HARDER FOR HIM TO STALL OR WIGGLE OUT OF HIS COMMITMENT.

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-- WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT WE GOT HIM TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO THE GOAL OF MAJORITY RULE IN ACHIEVABLE TERMS.

-- THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FIRMLY DEDICATED TO SEEING THIS GOAL ACHIEVED AND I BELIEVE WE CAN AND MUST WORK TOGETHER TO SEE THAT IT IS.

-- THE REAL CONCERN BEHIND MY LETTER WAS THAT THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THE GENEVA CONFERENCE STANDS TO BE LOST BY VIRTUE OF TRANSITIONAL PROPOSALS LIKE THAT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WHICH, AT LEAST AS PRESENTED, CONTAIN NO BALANCED STRUCTURE OF ASSURANCES OF AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SMITH AND HIS SUPPORTERS MAY SIMPLY CONCLUDE THAT AN ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED TRANSITION CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED AND MAY THEREFORE BACK OUT OF HIS COMMITMENT.

-- SMITH MUST AGREE TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO WHICH HE WILL HAND OVER POWER. WE CANNOT IMPOSE ONE, NOR CAN THE BRITISH. ONCE THERE IS A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT A WHOLE NEW SITUATION EXISTS, AND THE PROCESS TO MAJORITY RULE AND TRUE INDEPENDENCE IS INEXORABLE.

-- THE QUESTION NOW IS, WHAT CAN BE DONE?

B. CHONA'S PROPOSAL FOR INTERIM GOVERNMENT: MARK CHONA'S VIEWS ABOUT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ARE SIMILAR TO BUT  
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MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE AND CONCILIATORY THAN, THOSE IN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROPOSALS. HE ADVOCATES A ONE-TIER GOVERNMENT OF 25 MINISTRIES OF WHICH 20 WOULD BE HELD BY THE NATIONALISTS AND FIVE BY RHODESIAN WHITES NAMED BY THE UK. A BRITISH RESIDENT WOULD HAVE OVERALL SUPERVISION AND BRITAIN WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR (A) PREPARING AND PASSING THE ACT OF INDEPENDENCE, (B) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (C) ORGANIZING THE DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION, AND (D) THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND POLICE. (HE DISMISSES AS A NEGOTIATING TACTIC THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PROPOSAL THAT THE NATIONALISTS PLAY A ROLE IN CHOOSING AND DISCUSSING A BRITISH RESIDENT COMMISSIONER.) CHONA ARGUES THAT A BRITISH ROLE OFFERS AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR A WHITE RHODESIAN BLOCKING FORCE, ESPECIALLY IF BRITAIN TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ARMY, AND POLICE. HE ALSO ARGUES THAT FORMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES ARE UNNECESSARY GIVEN BRITISH-RHODESIAN CONTROL OF WHITE-OFFICERED POLICE FORCES, ALONG WITH CONTINUED WHITE DOMINATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY. CHONA REJECTS ANY ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF A COUNCIL OF STATE. WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THE ONE-TIER APPROACH REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE BACKING AWAY FROM CONCEPTS DISCUSSED BEFORE YOUR

MEETING WITH SMITH IN PRETORIA AND THAT WE SEE NO  
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REALISTIC EXPECTATION OF GETTING THE RHODESIANS OR  
SOUTH AFRICANS TO ACCEPT AN

INTERIM GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE THAT CONTAINED NO ADEQUATE  
SAFEGUARDS FOR WHITE RHODESIAN INTERESTS. ON THE OTHER  
HAND, CHONA'S VERSION OF THE ONE-TIER APPROACH COULD  
CONCEIVABLY SERVE AS A POLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, PROVIDED  
THAT THE BRITISH WOULD UNDERTAKE, AND THE RHODESIANS  
ACCEPT, THE KIND OF FUNCTIONS CHONA VISUALIZES.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- REINHARDT AND WISNER HAVE TOLD ME SOME OF YOUR VIEWS  
ABOUT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. HOW DO YOUR IDEAS DIFFER  
FROM THE EXTREME PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE PATRIOTIC  
FRONT?

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-- HOW WOULD YOU PROPOSE GAINING ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH IDEAS  
BY THE RHODESIANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS?

-- YOU TOLD REINHARDT YOU COULD OBTAIN A DOCUMENT THAT  
WOULD MAKE MORE EXPLICIT THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSURANCES  
AND PROTECTION YOU HAVE OUTLINED AND THAT THIS WOULD  
CARRY THE AGREEMENT OF THE NATIONALISTS AND FRONT LINE  
PRESIDENTS. DO YOU HAVE A DRAFT OF SUCH A DOCUMENT?

-- WHAT HAVE THE BRITISH SAID ABOUT YOUR VIEW OF THEIR  
ROLE?

-- WHILE WE APPRECIATE THE AFRICAN CONCERN ABOUT SMITH  
AND SHARE THEIR DESIRE TO MAKE THE TRANSITION PROCESS  
IRREVERSIBLE, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SMITH'S ATTITUDE NOW.  
HIS SEPTEMBER 24 ANNOUNCEMENT WAS DECISIVE. IT WAS NOT  
EASY TO GET HIM TO MAKE IT. THE WHITE RHODESIAN FEAR  
OF THE EFFECTS OF BECOMING PROPERTYLESS REFUGEES LIKE  
MANY OF THE PORTUGUESE WHO HAD TO FLEE FROM MOZAMBIQUE  
AND ANGOLA CANNOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. HENCE THEY WANT  
A STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT THAT WILL ASSURE THEM THAT THE  
TRANSITION WILL BE ORDERLY, WITHOUT THIS THEY WILL BACK  
OUT AND FIGHT.

-- GIVEN OUR COMMON AGREEMENT AND DETERMINATION TO  
ACHIEVE THE FINAL GOAL, THERE MUST BE SOME WAY TO FIND A  
COMPROMISE THAT PERMITS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

C. ZAMBIAN CONCERN ABOUT NAMIBIA. CHONA VOICED CONCERN  
TO WISNER THAT NUJOMA IS EFFECTIVELY BASED IN LUANDA NOW  
AND HAS BECOME A CAPTIVE OF A SOVIET-CUBAN PROGRAM FOR

HIM AND NAMIBIA. WHILE THIS APPROACH WAS DESCRIBED AS AN

URGENT MESSAGE FROM KAUNDA, AND MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED PARTLY TO SHOW THE MUTUALITY OF OUR INTERESTS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONCERN REFLECTED ABOUT NUJOMA IS SINCERE. IT DOES APPEAR THAT NUJOMA HAS SHIFTED HIS ASSOCIATION WESTWARD TO NETO IN LUANDA AND OBASANJO IN LAGOS, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER COULD BE HELPFUL IN COUNTERBALANCING COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.

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NUJOMA HAS NOT RESPONDED TO YOUR OVERTURES AND MAY HAVE DECIDED TO PUT MORE DEPENDENCE UPON GUERRILLA WARFARE THAN UPON NEGOTIATION. HE SEEMS TO BE AVOIDING LUSAKA.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- I APPRECIATE THE VIEWS YOUR PRESIDENT PASSED TO ME THROUGH YOU AND WISNER IN GENEVA. WE SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT NUJOMA AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ABOUT WHAT CAN BE DONE. -

-- SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE IN NAMIBIA. THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK IS AVAILABLE AND SOUTH AFRICA IS PREPARED TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS IF WE FOLLOW A PROCEDURE THAT WILL PERMIT VORSTER TO AVOID DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS. -

-- BUT NEGOTIATION CANNOT BEGIN UNLESS NUJOMA IS SPECIFICALLY WILLING TO ACCEPT THE PROGRESS AND TO NEGOTIATE. GIVEN SWAPO'S INTERNATIONAL STRENGTH, HE HAS NOTHING TO LOSE AND EVERYTHING TO GAIN.

-- WE BELIEVE THE RELEASE OF MOST POLITICAL PRISONERS IS POSSIBLE, ONCE THE PROCESS IS AGREED UPON, BUT OTHERWISE WE HAVE PUSHED THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS FAR AS THEY CAN GO AT THIS TIME.

-- THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO IF THE AFRICANS CANNOT BRING NUJOMA AROUND. PERHAPS OBASANJO COULD BE HELPFUL. HAS ZAMBIA DISCUSSED THIS WITH TANZANIA OR OTHER INTERESTED AFRICAN STATES. ROBINSON

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